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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of external conflict as a force that can
create social capital. Hostile inter-group interactions can help to resolve
intra-group social dilemmas but these potential gains must be weighed
against the insecurity of hostile relations with an out-group. Our central
result is that the presence of an outside threat can induce higher levels of
social capital either because a protective aspect of social capital comes into
play and/or as a reallocation of investments from private to social capital.
Given that social capital is potentially subject to free-riding, the threat,
by promoting a greater level of social capital, can be welfare improving.
When the threat is severe, social capital and welfare is more likely to
fall. This effect of an external threat on social capital is stronger in poor
economies. These results can shed light on the sometimes contradicting
empirical evidence on the relationship between conflict and social capital.
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”War gives a sense that we can rise above our smallness and divi-
siveness,”
Chris Hedges (2002).
1 Introduction
Conflictual group relationships are everywhere. As long as limited resources and
opportunities exist and antagonistic identities persist, rival communities will
clash. But hostile intergroup interactions can have ambiguous effects. Whilst
conflict and its anticipation can be costly in terms of diversion, destruction and
disruption of productive resources, out-group hostility may help to resolve in-
group social dilemmas. An empirical literature has recently emerged which finds
evidence of increased pro-social behaviour and collective action in societies that
have experienced conflict.1 A number of field and laboratory experiments cor-
roborate that in-group relations improve as a response to the existence of a rival
out-group.2 This might not be that surprising. As argued by Choi and Bowles
(2007) and Bowles (2009), individually costly norms of pro-group behaviour are
evolutionary adaptive in hostile environments. Conflict can induce pro-social
changes in preferences among members of affected communities (Voors et al.,
2012). External threats also kickstart communal coping processes (Lyons et al.,
1998), that is, mechanisms of cooperative problem-solving that emerge when a
community must confront adversity. In sum, violence and conflict can enhance
social capital and potentially compensate the costly diversion of resources and
destruction that they bring.
Examples of the positive effect of external conflict on trust and social cohe-
sion abound, from the local to the national level. During the decade-long civil
war in Liberia, neighborhood watch schemes became a community response
against burglary and related crimes (Sawyer, 2005). Bellows and Miguel (2008)
describe how communities in Sierra Leone organized local fighting groups dur-
ing the civil war; civilians volunteered to these groups which were supplied and
funded through local contributions. Similar self-defence forces have emerged in
villages in Afghanistan in response to Taliban insurgency (Jones and Mun˜oz,
2010). At a macro level, sociologists and political scientists have often argued
1For a recent survey, see Bauer et al. (2016).
2See Erev et al (1993), Bornstein et al (2002), Bornstein (2003); Halevy et al (2008). Voors
et al (2012) conducted field experiments in Burundi, and Gneezy and Fessler (2012) before
and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.
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that interstate war strengthens national identity. For instance, Smith (1981)
postulated that Medieval France and Spain owed their sense of national unity
to their wars against the English and the Moors respectively. In modern times,
interstate war might have contributed to state-building processes such as the
German unification of the 19th century (Sambanis et al., 2015).
With this evidence in mind, the present paper explores the role of conflict as
a force that can create social capital. This is important because there is persua-
sive empirical evidence indicating that social capital contributes significantly
to growth and development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001;
Sobel, 2002; Guiso et al., 2004). We build a model that focuses on investments
in social and private capital. We analyze how conflict affects the investment
decisions made by members of a community threatened by an external entity.
Our main argument is that in the absence of conflict, the public good nature of
social capital leads to free-riding and under-investment in social capital. Con-
flict can help overcome this collective action problem because social capital also
has a protective facet that helps the community to confront the external threat.
As a result, the external threat stimulates social capital as there now exists a
protective reason to invest in it, in addition to the productive reason to invest
which already existed under autarky.
For a relatively wealthy society, the protective facet of social capital also
stimulates investment in private capital as it is made more productive by the
increase in social capital. Supposing it is relatively small, the presence of an ex-
ternal threat can actually increase social welfare. To be clear, we are not arguing
here that societies should engage in conflict just to increase their social capital
and overall welfare. Our theory rather suggests that communities confronting
an external threat can resist and in some cases develop relatively successfully.
On the other hand, when the threat becomes relatively strong, welfare may fall
below the autarkic level. In that case it is difficult to protect capital returns and
as a result, capital investment falls in favour of non-expropriable consumption.
Our model can thus help to reconcile the existence of the aforementioned evi-
dence showing that conflict is linked to higher social capital together with the
evidence showing that conflict can undermine trust, willingness to trade, and
associational membership.3
We then move to the study of relatively poor societies which are constrained
3Rohner et al. (2013) and De Luca and Verpoorten (2015) find this in Uganda; Cassar et
al. (2013) in Tajikistan; Becchetti et al. (2014) in Kenya. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014)
find this for a panel of Africa countries.
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in terms of how much they are able to invest in all forms of capital. Now,
increases in social capital stimulated by the threat come at the expense of a
reduction in private capital. As a result, the virtuous knock-on effect for low
levels of the threat experienced by unconstrained economies is lost for con-
strained economies. Poor economies become more social capital intensive than
wealthy economies subject to a threat of the same intensity. But these con-
strained economies are also less able to protect themselves and, as a result, they
are less likely to attain full security of property rights.
Our next result refers to the case where social capital has bonding elements,
defined as forms of connectedness created within homogenous groups (Putnam,
2000). This type of social capital is potentially less productive but easier to form
as it based on relations with similar individuals. Rather than modelling several
types of social capital, we opt for parsimony and assume that social capital
can have consumption-like returns. This is because the returns of the bonding
facet of social capital are not easily expropriated and therefore may be very
attractive to a community under threat. We show that if the bonding aspect of
social capital is sufficiently strong, the level of social capital under the threat is
always above the level under autarky. Not only that. The level of social capital
is monotonically increasing in the scale of the threat. As the threat intensifies,
members of the community divert their investments from expropriable private
capital to partially expropriable social capital. Although it may make sense to
invest in it because it is not subject to theft, the bonding aspect of social capital
might not be productive enough to compensate the reduction in private capital
investments and the insecurity that the threat provokes.
There are a number of papers which attempt to model social capital formally
despite its dual nature as input and output of social interactions (Durlauf and
Fafchamps, 2006). These attempts can be broadly divided into two perspectives.
The first one is microeconomic and sees social capital mostly as an output.4 On
the other hand, the macroeconomic perspective tends to see social capital as an
input in production. We follow a similar approach in our analysis. In a pio-
neering contribution, Glaeser et al. (2002) model social capital as an individual
characteristic which agents invest in and that has positive externalities for the
rest of society. The closest paper to ours within this literature is Beugeldisijk
4That output can be quality of the neighborhood (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999), par-
ticipation in associational activities (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000), the prevalence of friendly
trade (Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003) or the proportion of trustworthy individuals in
society (Franc¸ois and Zabojnik, 2005).
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and Smaulders (2009) who consider several forms of social capital. Costly in-
vestments in one of these types can protect individuals from the expropriation
efforts of other agents. In a similar line to our findings, they show that certain
forms of social capital can crowd out economic growth.5
In the next section, we discuss various sources of evidence for our model,
which we present in section 3. In section 4 the model is applied to expropriable
social capital in a relatively wealthy economy. This represents the core part
of the paper. In section 5, we offer four extensions of the benchmark model.
Section 6 contains some additional discussion and concluding comments.
2 Illustrative examples
The theory we propose is that external conflict is a force that can create so-
cial capital and, under some circumstances, increase social welfare. Under our
definition, social capital has four key attributes. First, it can increase the pro-
ductivity of private capital. Second, it has a public good nature (Coleman,
1988), so it is typically underprovided. Third, as suggested by the aforemen-
tioned lab and field experiments, social capital can enhance collective action
and social cohesion in response to the presence of an out-group. Finally, social
capital is costly to produce; its formation requires significant investments of
time and effort (Bourdieu, 1994).
Under this definition, we argue that the presence of an external threat can
increase previously under-provided social capital because social capital helps the
community to protect itself. The increase in social capital can have a positive
effect on private investments and overall welfare. But a very intense external
conflict might reduce social capital and welfare because in that case the com-
munity cannot successfully thwart the risk of expropriation.
Our task in this section is to discuss a number of environments in which this
theory most readily applies and where we believe our model can shed light on
empirical or case study findings. We proceed from the neighborhood level to
interstate relations.
Neighborhood watch schemes Such schemes began in the US in the 1970s
and were exported to other countries such as the UK. Of course, their use is not
confined only to industrialised countries. Sawyer (2005) describes how citizens
5Other papers following a macro approach to social capital are Bisin and Guiatioli (2002),
Chou (2006), Estrella-Lo´pez (2003) and Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011)
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of Monrovia created neighborhood watch schemes as a community response
against burglary and related crimes committed by members of state security
forces during the Liberian civil war (1989-2003). Families organized make-shift
alarms to alert each other when assaulted; these alarms brought bands of neigh-
bors armed with machetes and other weapons. The bulk of empirical research on
neighborhood watch schemes is on their effectiveness in reducing crimes (Ben-
nett et al., 2006). In relation to our analysis, we are also interested in the
following question: What is the relationship between participation in neighbor-
hood watch schemes, which generates social capital, and the actual threat of
crime? Kang (2015) in a study of Seattle neighborhood watch schemes in the
1990s, finds that ‘individuals living in more residentially stable neighborhoods
and having lower crime rates of assaults are more likely to participate.’ (p. 207).
This finding is in line with a literature on social disorganisation that finds that
poor, disadvantaged communities are less likely to promote community actions.
Disadvantaged communities are also likely to be the ones that experience higher
crime and Kang’s study confirms this. In terms of our model, a relatively low
threat of crime can trigger a neighborhood watch scheme which increases so-
cial capital, which may in turn improve neighborhood security. For relatively
high levels of threat of crime, the neighborhood watch schemes struggle to form
implying lower levels of social capital, security and welfare.
Local infighting Kalyvas (2006) investigates empirical puzzles in civil war
and one of the most puzzling is the finding that societies rich in social capital
were also the most likely to denounce each other when conflict arises in their
neighborhood. He labels this as an example of ‘the dark side of social capital’.
So as argued, communities may find social cohesion as a response to low level
threat, but this very social cohesion can be turned against the community when
conflict actually arrives and the threat is very real and severe. The consequence
is lower social capital, security and welfare. This observation links to two other
examples where we believe our theory has relevance.
Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) establish a negative effect
of the slave trade on long-term economic development. They demonstrate that
individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided are less trusting today. Nunn
(2008) shows that it was usually the most prosperous societies that selected into
slave trades. This suggests that slave raids were an intense threat capable of
breaking social ties and trust even in communities with arguably higher levels
of social capital. In fact, the acquisition of slaves was largely conducted within
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communities against fellow neighbors. This violence undermined local trust.
The diminution of social capital stock due to the high threat level caused by
the slave trade is still felt in low trust and economic performance today.
A similar effect is reported by Cassar et al. (2013) who find that exposure to
violence reduced local trust in Tajikistan. The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) was
fought mainly at the village level. The absence of observable markers and the
complexity of rivalries and alliance networks made distinguishing friend from
foe virtually impossible. Cassar et al. (2013) find that this detrimental effect of
violence on local trust only holds in villages with a level of infighting above the
median. This is consistent with our prediction of very intense external threats
leading to lower levels of social capital, security and welfare.
Externally inflicted civil violence Bellows and Miguel (2009), Jones and
Mun˜oz (2010) and Gilligan et al. (2014) find that violence in Sierra Leone,
Afghanistan and Nepal respectively increased collective action and civic engage-
ment. A characteristic shared by these conflicts is that violence originated from
outside communities. In response, villages created cooperative coping mecha-
nisms whose positive effects on social capital are still felt today. During the
decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) violence was initially exerted
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF committed violent acts
throughout the country and against all ethnic groups. In response, large num-
bers of young villagers mobilised for purposes of civil defense (Richards et al.,
2004). Professional hunters trained these young men on how to track and am-
bush RUF forces. Later, many students and displaced farmers volunteered too.
These civil forces were successful in countervailing the RUF and helped farmers
to repopulate the countryside. Similarly in Afghanistan, local defence groups
have emerged around the traditional policing institution of the arkabai in or-
der to defend their villages from the Taliban (Jones and Mun˜oz, 2010). These
groups of villagers thwart insurgents’ demands for money, new recruits, food
and fuel, and impede Taliban attempts to close schools and ban music festivals
and other cultural manifestations. The arkabai also help insurgents to reinte-
grate in their communities and thus may have a positive effect on their long-run
levels of social capital.
During the Nepalese civil war (1998-2006), violence was mostly inflicted
by Maoists. In her account of Nepalese daily life during the war, Pettigrew
(2004) describes several communal coping strategies that villagers enacted in
response to the threat of Maoist violence. Villagers tracked the movement and
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numbers of troops approaching their village and shared this information with
others. Younger neighbors offered company and protection to elder villagers in
exchange for accommodation in their quarters. The conflict also increased the
civic engagement of marginalised groups. For instance, women in the village
of Kwei Nasa took over the management of a day-care centre and ran it suc-
cessfully after the staff fled in fear of the insurgents. External threats had a
similar effect on Southern Sudanese villages during its second civil war (1982-
2005). Deng (2010) shows that social capital increased in areas threatened by
Arab militias. Mutual labor assistance arrangements became widespread and
household composition changed to incorporate non-relatives.
Nationalism For our final example we turn to Snyder (2000) and his com-
prehensive analysis of the link between democratisation and the creation of
belligerent nationalist identity. He classifies four types of nationalism. Counter-
revolutionary nationalism is identified with Germany in the 19th and early 20th
centuries as the old elites use nationalism as a means to stave off internal threats
caused by demands for democracy. Democracy was a threat, and the promotion
of nationalism was used to divide potential rivals. It was successful but under-
mined itself because the excessively belligerent nature of German nationalism
led ultimately, in Snyder’s analysis, to World Wars One and Two. It is clear
how this fits with our model. Nationalism is created as a response to the threat
of democracy and thus increases social capital. However, a dynamic is set in
motion such that a bigger threat than democracy emerges in the form of war
with other nation states. Ultimately, social capital levels may be higher because
of nationalism, but Germany became insecure and welfare was lower due to war
than if there had been no conflict. Belligerent and destructive nationalism is to
be found in two of Snyder’s other classifications; revolutionary nationalism as
in France after the revolution and ethnic nationalism as in pre World War One
Serbia. In both cases nationalism was used as a socially cohesive rallying call,
but in both cases led to destructive and self-defeating conflict that would seem
to offset any gains that may have come from increased social capital. Finally,
Snyder analyses civic nationalism which was developed in Britain as a produc-
tive form of nationalism. Admittedly, it was also belligerent and also led to
conflict, but Snyder argues that British conflict was nearly always calculated.
To that extent, British nationalism (which also was a response to threat) could
be viewed as welfare-improving because it was not allowed to get out of control
and spark the excessive threats that lead to overextension and military defeat.
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An alternative theory, also relevant to our analysis, is that nationalism was
employed to increase military effectiveness. In his pioneering study, Posner
(1993) argues that developments in military technology during the 19th cen-
tury required increased cooperation in the battlefield and an enhanced spirit of
self-sacrifice. Nationalism, instilled through education, was seen as a response
to that problem. A sense of national identity helped to generate soldiers’ com-
mitment, training proficiency, and solidarity in combat, but also facilitated the
replacement of troops, now severely decimated by the increased firepower of the
new military technologies.
3 The Model
3.1 Autarky
Let us start by considering the case in which there exists just one community
N formed by n identical agents indexed by i = 1, ..., n. These agents hold an
endowment e. They can use this endowment for consumption, denoted by ci,
investment in private capital ki, or investment in social capital si. Thus the
individual budget constraint is ki + si + ci ≤ e. Alternatively, the endowment e
can be seen as time, so the amount e−ki−si would be the leisure enjoyed by the
individual. The investment in private capital can be thought as investment in
economic projects, financial assets or entrepreneurial activities. The investment
in social capital can be interpreted as investments in building norms and codes
of proper behavior, reciprocal networks of trust, reputation, credit institutions
or property rights. It is a form of capital because it is capable of generating a
stream of future benefits (Chou, 2006).
Investments in private and social capital generate returns according to a
function f(ki, S) where S =
∑
i∈N si. Note that according to our interpretation
and the standard descriptions in the literature, we model social capital as a
public good (Coleman, 1988; Glaeser et al., 2002). With some abuse of notation,
let us denote by fk and fs the marginal return of individual investments in
private and social capital respectively.
The returns function f(ki, S) satisfies a number of standard properties.
Assumption 1 The returns function f(ki, S) is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, concave and satisfies lim
k→0
fk →∞ and lim
S→0
fs > 1.
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Assumption 2 The marginal return of private capital is non-decreasing in the
level of social capital, i.e. fks ≥ 0
Assumption 1 ensures an individual optimum investment profile exists and
that agents invest a positive amount in private and social capital at that solu-
tion. Assumption 2 is in line with the definition of social capital: social capital
enhances the productivity of other forms of capital, including private capital.
This description fits mostly with the form of ‘bridging’ social capital (Putnam,
2000). Bridging social capital builds trust and networks, reduces the need for
monitoring and enforcement activities, and smooths investment opportunities.
The idea is that the returns on investments of this type are broad and accessible
even to those who are not a member of the group. Assumption 2 does not rule
out the case where the returns of social and private capital are separable, i.e.
fks = 0. This would correspond to forms of social capital which are exclusionary
and accessible only to members of a restricted group (e.g. family, kin). This is
often labelled ‘bonding’ social capital; we will turn our attention to this case in
Section 5.2.
We will assume that members of the group N hold utility functions of the
following form
uAi = ci + f(ki, S) (1)
= e− ki − si + f(ki, si + S−i),
where the superscript A denotes that this is the autarkic scenario and S−i
denotes the sum of social capital investments of members of N different from i.
Each member chooses a pair ki and si simultaneously in order to maximize (1)
taking as given the investment in social capital made by the rest of the group
S−i. We will be interested in characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game
played by the members of the group. Since social capital is provided through
members’ voluntary contributions, free-riding will ensue.
Given our assumptions, best responses are uniquely defined and a Nash
equilibrium exists. Throughout the paper we will focus on the symmetric equi-
librium, which can be characterized by a pair (kA, SA). The FOCs which char-
acterize this equilibrium, assuming it is interior, yield the typical equalization
of marginal returns across investments
1 = fk(k
A, SA) = fs(k
A, SA). (2)
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Note that the first best solution, denoted by (k∗∗, S∗∗), would require the
standard equalization of marginal cost of investment in social capital and the
sum of its individual marginal returns, so that
1 = fk(k
∗∗, S∗∗) = nfs(k∗∗, S∗∗).
Social capital is thus under-provided under voluntary contribution compared
to the first-best. Below we will show that the threat of conflict can actually help
society to get closer to that first best level of social capital.
3.2 The threat
Let us now add to the previous setting the existence of an external agent that
seeks to expropriate the group’s income. We refer to this agent simply as the
threat. For simplicity, we will assume that the intensity of the threat is given by
an exogenous level T . Our focus is on the choice of agents within the threatened
group and for that reason we do not model the threat and endogenise its choice
of intensity. This is not a grossly excessive simplification when the external
threat is an entity of fixed strength or if the entity moved first, as for instance,
when the community is responding to a serious terrorist attack. Alternatively,
the threat could be a commonly held perception which may or may not relate
to reality. Alternatively, this set up would correspond to contexts where the
threat is a non-strategic agent such as the anticipation of a natural disaster.
Nevertheless, we endogenise the intensity of the threat in Section 5.3 and show
there that our main results hold true.
Our critical assumption at this point is that the fraction of the returns from
investment that members of the community can shield from the threat is a func-
tion of its level of social capital. The evidence presented in Section 2 suggests
that social capital enhances the chances of a community in prevailing against
competing out-groups: Social capital facilitates the emergence of neighborhood
watches and self-defence groups, and increases combat power in the battlefield.
We thus assume that investments in social capital S and the intensity of the
threat T determine p(T, S), the fraction of individual returns that members of
the group can protect. This function has the following properties.
Assumption 3 The protection function p(T, S) ∈ [0, 1] is twice differentiable,
weakly increasing and concave in S, weakly decreasing in T and it satisfies
p(T, 0) = 0 and p(0, S) = 1 for any S.
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This assumption is natural. Protection decreases with the intensity of the
threat and increases with the level of social capital in the community. All
returns are protected when the threat is of zero intensity, that is, when it is
absent. Assumption 3 is satisfied by several reasonable and commonly-used
contest success functions6.
Let us assume for the time being that all the returns of social and individual
capital are subject to expropriation. In that case, the payoff for a member of
the community is given by
uCi = e− ki − si + p(T, S)f(ki, si + S−i), (3)
where the superscript C denotes the conflict scenario. Again, members maxi-
mize (3) taking as given S−i. The optimal interior solution to their problem is
given by the FOC
1 = p(T, SC)fk(k
C , SC) = ps(T, S
C)f(kC , SC) + p(T, SC)fs(k
C , SC). (4)
Compared to the autarchy, the marginal return of private capital is reduced
by the fraction expropriated by the threat. However, the return of social cap-
ital is now augmented by its protective effect. Although the threat captures
a fraction 1 − p(T, S) of the returns of social capital, the protection it offers
can potentially lead to a higher equilibrium level. The enhanced productivity
of social capital can also incentivise investments in private capital despite its
returns now being insecure. That is, although fk(k
C , SC) ≥ fk(kA, SA), it still
might be that SC > SA because fks ≥ 0 by Assumption 2.
Observe that we are superimposing a new collective action problem on top of
the problem of voluntary provision of social capital. Protection is also a public
good; it is equally enjoyed by all members of the community. So the equilibrium
level of protection attained under individual contributions p(T, S) would still be
lower than the level of security resulting from a cooperative choice of S.
Note that we have assumed that social capital is the only tool a community
has to protect itself. In Section 5.4, we extend the analysis and consider the
case where the community has access to other protective investments such as
arms or professional armies.
6As for instance, the Tullock ratio function (Tullock, 1967)
p(T, S) =
S
S + T
.
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4 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize more precisely the conditions under which the
presence of a hostile out-group can lead to higher or lower levels of social capital
and welfare compared to autarky.
Let us consider the case when the returns from both private and social capital
are subject to expropriation by the threat as in (4) and social capital contributes
to increase the returns of private investments, i.e. fks > 0. In order to generate
predictions, we will assume some convenient functional forms. In particular, we
will assume that the returns function follows a Cobb-Douglas specification
f(ki, S) = k
α
i S
β . (5)
The parameters α, β > 0 measure the return elasticity of private and social
capital respectively.
The technology of protection takes the following functional form, inspired
by the ones considered in Grossman and Kim (1996) and Robinson (2001):
p(T, S) =
{ (
S
T
)σ
if T > S
1 otherwise
(6)
This function has a constant elasticity σ ≥ 0. Security can be full when the
community is cohesive enough relative to the intensity of the threat.7 The group
is completely unprotected, i.e. p(T, S) = 0, only when the threat is infinitely
large. We assume α + β + σ < 1 in order to ensure that Assumptions 1-3 are
satisfied and that an interior equilibrium exists.
Autarky The interior symmetric solution to the problem of a representative
member of the community is given by the FOCs
∂uAi
∂ki
= −1 + αkα−1i Sβ = 0; (7)
∂uAi
∂si
= −1 + βkαi Sβ−1 = 0. (8)
The interior equilibrium level of social capital under autarky is then
SA =
[
ααβ1−α
] 1
1−α−β . (9)
7The Tullock functional form described in footnote 6 does not satisfy this property.
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For the time being, we will assume that the values of the parameters are
such that individuals are unconstrained, i.e. e ≥ kA + 1nSA. In Section 5.1, we
consider the case where the economy is constrained.
Let us at this stage introduce the ratio between equilibrium social and private
capital. This ratio measures the relative intensity of the two forms of capital.
In the autarky case, this ratio in equilibrium is given simply by the ratio of the
return elasticities
rA =
β
α
. (10)
It will be important in what follows to compute the equilibrium payoff of
individuals in the community. Simple calculations show this is equal to
u∗A = e+ SA[
1− α
β
− 1
n
].
Threat Consider now the situation where the community faces a rival who
is threatening to destroy or expropriate its output. Individual members now
maximize (3) where the return function is as (5) and p(T, S) is of the form in
(6). From this it is immediate to see that if the threat is not very intense,
the problem faced by the group is the same as under autarky. The equilibrium
level of social capital SA can guarantee full security, i.e. p(T, SA) = 1. In other
words, define as To the intensity of the threat such that To = S
A; for any T ≤ To
the solution in the threat case must be identical to the one under autarky.
When the threat is of moderate intensity, given that social capital has a
protective effect, it may be individually beneficial for members to invest in
social capital beyond the autarkic level. In that case, full security can persist if
the group can coordinate in an equilibrium where the level of social capital is
such that T ≤ S. For that to be individually optimal, the marginal product of
social capital must be above its marginal cost when S = T, that is,
∂uCi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
S=T
= −1 + (β + σ)kαi T β−1 > 0.
This together with the first order condition
∂uCi
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
S=T
= −1 + αkα−1i T β = 0,
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defines a new intensity threshold
T1 ≡
[
αα(β + σ)1−α
] 1
1−α−β ,
such that SC = T is an equilibrium whenever T ∈ [To, T1].
This equilibrium breaks down when the intensity of the threat is sufficiently
strong. Then it becomes too individually costly to protect the group fully, and
members divert their choices from investment to consumption. In other words,
when T > T1, the interior symmetric solution is given by the equations
∂uCi
∂ki
= −1 + αkα−1i
Sβ+σ
Tσ
= 0;
∂uCi
∂si
= −1 + (β + σ)kαi
Sβ+σ−1
Tσ
= 0,
leading to the equilibrium level of social capital
SC =
[
αα(β + σ)1−α
Tσ
] 1
1−α−β−σ
. (11)
As expected, the equilibrium level of social capital in this region is decreasing
in T . The level of social capital in (11) converges to zero as the threat becomes
arbitrarily intense. Hence, there exists another threshold T2 > T1 such that
SC = SA when T = T2. Beyond that threshold, the threat is so intense that
investment in social capital falls below its autarkic level.
We are now in the position to state our first result, which derives directly
from the discussion above.
Proposition 1 When social capital augments private capital and individual en-
dowments e are sufficiently large
a) If T ≤ To, the level of social capital under conflict is the same as under
autarky and there is full security.
b) If T ∈ (To, T1], social capital under conflict is higher than under autarky and
there is full security.
c) If T ∈ (T1, T2], security is partial but social capital under conflict is still
higher than under autarky.
d) If T > T2, the level of social capital under conflict is lower than under
autarky and security is partial.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium level of social capital
Figure 1 illustrates this result. For low level threats, the community oper-
ates as under autarky. The emergence of a more intense threat leads to higher
investments in social capital because of its cohesive effects. Social capital in-
creases protection, leading to higher investments in private capital as well. This
enhancing effect persists even when the threat is strong, although in that case
the community is not fully protected. When the threat is very intense, however,
the threat of expropriation leads to a decapitalisation of the community.
rC =

β
α if T ≤ To
(T
1−α−β
α )
1
1−α if T ∈ (To, T1)
β+σ
α if T ≥ T1
.
A comparison with (10) shows that the economy under threat is always more
social-capital intensive than under autarky.
Welfare Proposition 1 shows that the threat helps to solve the collective ac-
tion problem present in autarky. Members of the group have an additional
incentive to invest in social capital in order to increase the protection of the
returns of their investments. The new level of social capital is thus closer to
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the first best under autarky, S∗∗. It actually can surpass that level.8. When the
threat is moderate, i.e. T ∈ (To, T1), this increase in social capital also enhances
the marginal return of private capital, making individuals invest more in both
forms of capital than under autarky. This implies that the threat can have a
potential welfare enhancing effect, as the following Proposition states
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold T̂ ∈ (T1, T2) such that for any intensity
of the threat T ∈ (To, T̂ ), welfare under conflict is higher than under
autarky, i.e. u∗C > u∗A.
Proof. Simple calculations show that the equilibrium payoff for a member of
the group in this case is
u∗C =

u∗A if T ≤ To
e+ (1− α) (ααT β) 11−α − Tn if T ∈ (To, T1)
e+ SC [ 1−αβ+σ − 1n ] if T ≥ T1
.
Because the solution is unconstrained when T ≤ To and T ≥ T1, we can
apply the envelope theorem directly, so the effect of T on u∗C is just the direct
effect. In the first case, u∗C does not depend on T. In the second, u∗C is strictly
decreasing in T via p(S∗, T ).When T ∈ (To, T1), recall that p(S∗, T ) = 1 because
SC = T. Using the chain rule
∂u∗Ci
∂T
=
∂uCi
∂SC
∂SC
∂T
> 0,
where the inequality follows from ∂S
C
∂T = 1 and that when T ∈ (To, T1)
∂uCi
∂S
= −1 + p(T, T )fs(k∗i , T ) + ps(T, T )f(k∗i , T )
= −1 + (β + σ)
T
f(k∗i , T ) > 0.
Therefore, equilibrium welfare is increasing in the interval (To, T1).
Given that u∗C is strictly decreasing in T when T ≥ T1, and converges to
zero when T becomes arbitrarily large (because SC converges to zero), there
must exist a level of the threshold T̂ such that u∗C = u∗A. This threshold T̂
must be strictly smaller than T2 because at that level S
C = SA so u∗C =
e+ SA[ 1−αβ+σ − 1n ] < e+ SA[ 1−αβ − 1n ] = u∗A.
8When the size of the group is sufficiently small so that n < (β+σ
β
)1−α, there exists a
range of threat intensities within the interval (To, T1) such that S∗∗ < SC .
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When the threat is of low intensity, it introduces no distortion in the econ-
omy. But when it is moderate, the threat induces members of the community
to enhance its cohesion by investing in social capital. This partially solves the
collective action problem that leads to underinvestment in social capital under
autarky. This welfare enhancing effect can survive even for threat intensities so
high that the community cannot protect itself fully, i.e. T ∈ (T1, T̂ ). When the
intensity of the threat is too severe, though, members divert their investments
into consumption, leading to lower levels of welfare.
Relation with the conflict literature The economics of conflict literature
has extensively dealt with conflictual group interactions.9 However, most of
this literature takes a macro perspective in that it tends to assume a group as
a single organic entity. This assumption leads to one of the main tenets of this
literature, namely that conflict is fundamentally costly, even when it does not
actually occur, because it destroys resources, disrupts economic activities and
has a negative effect on future investment (Collier, 1999). Such costs remain
even in a world of no open conflict because investments in arms as a credible
deterrence are costly as they divert resources from productive activities. The
unitary group assumption ignores the potential countervailing force that conflict
brings, that is, that inter-group conflict groups may help to resolve intra-group
social dilemmas and provide cooperative welfare gains.
A few papers explore this possibility. Sanchez-Pages (2006) argues that if
there is a tragedy of the commons that cannot be resolved formally or informally,
violence may be efficiency enhancing if it provides exclusive rights to the victor.
Mu¨nster and Staal (2011) argue that conflict against an external group may
be welfare-improving if it uses up resources on external fighting that would
otherwise have been used on internal fighting. Hugh-Jones and Zaltan (2012)
show how an external threat can induce in-group cooperation to establish a
reputation under a weakest-link structure. While we also focus on the possibility
of conflict resolving a collective action problem, the focus of our paper is on
social capital and the form that it may take.
A strand of the economics of conflict literature has centred upon the security
of property rights. Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996) developed a predator/prey
model where the prey moves first and invests in capital and arms in order to
protect its property before the predator makes a decision whether it is profitable
to attack given the prey’s prior investment in arms. Our model is inspired by
9See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for an excellent review.
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this approach and could also be framed as a dynamic model where present
investments have future returns subject to the risk of expropriation.
5 Extensions
5.1 Constrained Economies
So far we have assumed that members of the community were wealthy enough
to be unconstrained in their choices. In this Section, we will consider the case of
poorer economies were individuals are constrained in equilibrium. We will show
that the enhancing effect of conflict on social capital is stronger in these societies,
but at the expense of lower investments in private capital. Consequently, the
welfare effect is more ambiguous.
First, let us define the equilibrium investment under autarky:
eA ≡ kA + 1
n
SA = SA[
α
β
+
1
n
].
Similarly, the maximum equilibrium investment under the threat is given by
eC ≡ kC(T1) + 1
n
SC(T1),
because investments in both forms of capital attain a maximum at T = T1.
If e < eC the economy is constrained for a certain range of threat intensities.
If the threat is not too intense, or if it is very strong, the interior strategy
profile characterized above is still an equilibrium. Otherwise, the economy is
constrained. But it is easy to see that the results in Proposition 1 would still
hold qualitatively. The only difference is that the level of social and private
capital remain constant, and above the autarkic levels, in the range of threat
intensities for which the economy is constrained.
Things are different when e < eA. In that case, the economy is already
constrained under autarky. We will say that the community is severely con-
strained in this case. In autarky, the equalization of marginal products yield
the equilibrium level of social capital
S
A
=
β
β + nα
ne.
By the same token as in the previous Section, if the intensity of the threat is
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sufficiently low, that is, if T ≤ T o ≡ SA, this level is also the equilibrium level
of social capital under conflict. If the threat becomes more intense, though, it
is again the case that the group coordinates in an equilibrium with full security
and enhanced investments in social capital. For higher intensities, full security
is no longer an equilibrium and protection is only partial. In this case, the
equilibrium level of social capital is
S
C
=
σ + β
σ + β + nα
ne.
Note that this equilibrium level of social capital is independent of the in-
tensity of the threat and strictly greater than S
A
. Hence, when the intensity
of the threat is high, that is, when T > S
C
social capital is higher under the
threat than in autarky. Observe that because S
C
does not depend on T, social
cohesion is maintained at the expense of investments in private capital. The
following proposition summarizes all these results.
Proposition 3 In severely constrained economies, i.e. when e < eA:
a) If T ≤ SA, the levels of social and private capital under conflict are the same
as under autarky and there is full security.
b) If T > S
A
, social (private) capital under conflict is higher (lower) than
under autarky and there is full security.
c) If T ≥ SC , the levels of social and private capital are as in b) but security
is partial.
Proof. The only statement not following immediately from the discussion
above is that the equilibrium level of private capital under the threat is lower
than under autarky when T ∈ (SA, SC). To see this just note that the equilib-
rium level of social capital is T in that region. Hence, the equilibrium level of
private capital is e− 1nT. Comparing that with k
A
shows
e− 1
n
T < k
A ⇔ T > β
β + nα
ne = S
A
.
Being constrained, members of the community invest more in the form of
capital which yields higher returns. This is social capital because when the
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threat emerges, social capital becomes more productive due to its protective
effect. But since the economy is constrained, the autarky level of social capital
protects the community fully for a smaller range of threat intensities compared
to the unconstrained case. This can be seen by noting that S
A
< To. Noting
also that S
C
< T1 leads to the following corollary
Corollary The range of threat intensities for which social capital is higher un-
der conflict than under peace is larger for constrained economies than for
unconstrained economies. In addition, constrained economies attain full
security for a smaller range of threat intensities.
Poor societies under threat become both more intensive in social capital and
less secure than wealthy societies under a threat of the same intensity. Wealthy
societies have the capability of resisting threats of higher intensities due to their
larger resources. Poor societies respond to threats of expropriation by increasing
their level of social capital, which helps them to increase their cohesion. But
to do so they must reduce their levels of investment in private capital. As the
threat becomes more intense, these societies become even more social capital
intensive. Still, their smaller resources lead to lower security resulting in poor
economies being subject to effective expropriation for a wider range of threats.
5.2 Separable social capital
There are a number of returns from social capital which cannot be easily expro-
priated. Take group identity for instance. Identity is a source of social capital
because it provides a dense set of networks for which only membership of the
group have access (Wintrobe, 1995). Because of this, social capital in the form
of group identity may be less expropriable. Non-expropriable social capital can
also be the result of socialization with family or friends and have a consumption
value. It can also be a form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1984) created through
identity-building activities or conflict itself. To capture these instances of social
capital as ‘bonding’, let us now separate the returns from social capital from
their interaction with other forms of capital. As a result, these returns cannot
be fully expropriated. This offers a new channel through which the threat of
conflict can create social capital: insecurity induces individuals to divert their
investments from expropriable to non-expropriable forms of capital.
To model this possibility, we opt for parsimony and extend the model by
assuming that social capital can have consumption-like returns. In real life,
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most forms of social capital are likely to have both investment and consump-
tion/bonding qualities.10 So let us assume that returns from investment are
given by the function f(ki, S) + γS. The parameter γ > 0 measures the return
of the non-expropriable facets of social capital. In case of autarky, the optimal
interior investments in private and social capital satisfy
1− γ = fk(kA, SA) = fs(kA, SA), (12)
which, given Assumption 1, implies that investments in both types of capital
are higher compared to the case when social capital was non-separable. This
is to be expected. Social capital has now an additional source of returns which
leads to higher investments and to a higher marginal return of private capital.
In case of conflict, the payoff of a community member now becomes
uCi = e− ki − si + p(T, S)f(ki, si + s−i) + γS.
Note that we are not assuming here that all the returns of social capital are
non-expropriable, only part of them.
Assuming that the economy is unconstrained, it is straightforward to show
that for γ < 1 the results in Section 3 still hold qualitatively. Let us focus
instead in the case where γ ≥ 1. In that scenario, the marginal return of social
capital is always greater than its marginal cost so in equilibrium individuals
invest their entire endowment in both forms of capital. Hence, SC = n(e− kC),
where kC is such that
γ + ps(T, n(e− kC))f(kC , n(e− kC))
p(T, n(e− kC)) = fk(k
C , n(e− kC))− fs(kC , n(e− kC)).
(13)
Similarly to the constrained case, the marginal return of private and social
capital must be equal at the optimal solution. The comparison of expressions
(12) and (13) yields the following result.
Proposition 4 When the non-expropriable returns of social capital are high
enough, i.e. γ ≥ 1, the equilibrium level of social (private) capital under
the threat is higher (lower) than under autarky. Moreover, if the returns
10Bridging and bonding social capital are ultimately psychological concepts based on collec-
tive identity. The former is presented as a production rather than a utility function, because
the key benefit deriving from it is instrumental. It provides a vehicle through which produc-
tive private capital can be utilised effectively. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, is
depicted as a direct psychological consumption benefit without productive properties.
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function is as in (5) and the technology of protection is (6), the equilibrium
level of social capital is strictly increasing in the intensity of the threat.
Proof. When γ > 1, optimal investment choices must equate marginal returns
so that under autarky
fs(k
A, SA) + γ = fk(k
A, SA)⇔
γ = fk(k
A, n(e− kA))− fs(kA, n(e− kA)).
On the other hand, when the threat is strong enough, rearranging (13) show
that optimal investment choices under conflict must satisfy
γ = p(T, n(e− kC))[fk(kC , n(e− kC))− fs(kC , n(e− kC))]
−ps(T, n(e− kC))f(kC , n(e− kC)).
Therefore we can establish that in this case
γ < p(T, n(e− kC))[fk(kC , n(e− kC))− fs(kC , n(e− kC))]
< fk(k
C , n(e− kC))− fs(kC , n(e− kC)).
The second inequality holds from the fact that for (14) to hold fk(k
C , n(e−
kC)) > fs(k
C , n(e− kC)). Note now that by Assumption 1 and 2, the difference
fk(k, n(e − k)) − fs(k, n(e − k)) is strictly decreasing in k. Hence, it must be
that kC < kA because
fk(k
A, n(e−kA)))−fs(kA, n(e−kA)) = γ < fk(kC , n(e−kC))−fs(kC , n(e−kC)).
Given that individuals invest their entire endowment in the two scenarios, it
must then also be that SC > SA. When the threat is not strong enough, i.e.
T ≤ SA, the two scenarios coincide so SC = SA.
Finally, let us show that the equilibrium level of social capital is increasing
in the intensity of the threat T. Define
H(T, SC) = p(T, SC))[fk(e− S
C
n
, SC)− fs(e− S
C
n
, SC)]
−ps(T, SC)f(e− S
C
n
, SC)− γ = 0.
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By the implicit function theorem,
∂SC
∂T
= −
∂H(T,SC)
∂T
∂H(T,SC)
∂SC
.
For the numerator, taking the functional form (5),
∂H(T, SC)
∂T
= −σ (S
C)α+β−1
T 1+σ(e− SCn )1−α
(αS − (σ + β)(e− S
C
n
))
= −σ γ
T
< 0,
where the second equality comes from rewriting (13) using the functional forms
(5) and (6). On the other hand, tedious calculations yield
∂H(T, SC)
∂SC
=
(e− SCn )1−α
TσSα+β−1
[
(SC(α+
β + σ
n
)− (β + σ)e)( 1− α
ne− SC −
1− α− β
SC
) + α+
β + σ
n
]
.
= γ
[
1− α
e− SC −
1− α− β
SC
+
α+ β+σn
SC(α+ β+σn )− (β + σ)e
]
> γ
[
1− α
e− SC −
1− α− β
SC
+
1
SC
]
= γ
[
1− α
e− SC +
α+ β
SC
]
> 0,
where the second equality again comes from (13). Therefore, ∂S
C
∂T > 0 so the
equilibrium level of social capital is increasing in the intensity of the threat T.
This Proposition shows that when the bonding part of social capital is suf-
ficiently strong, the emergence of a threat leads to a diversion of investments
from private to social capital. As a result, the economy becomes more social
capital intensive. Society is making additional investments in a narrower, so-
cially cohesive form of social capital such as group identity, which is harder to
expropriate. This, to some extent, can explain the adoption of a culture that
appears to be closed and lacking in bridges: It can be a response to the presence
of hostile out-groups.
When social capital is not fully expropriable, the effect of the threat on
welfare is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the threat is pushing individuals
to invest in a form of capital which was underprovided under peace due to a
collective action problem. On the other hand, the non-expropriable side of social
capital might not be productive enough to compensate the reduction in private
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capital and the insecurity that the threat provokes.
The threat can thus bring high levels of social capital and lower levels of
welfare. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain sharper results beyond par-
ticular examples.
Example Consider the case where β = 0 so social capital does not augment
private capital. The equilibrium level of social capital under autarky is
SA = n(e− (α
γ
)
1
1−α ).
If the intensity of the threat is below this threshold, the threat introduces
no distortion in the economy. Suppose that the threat is above this threshold
and let us assume that social capital has no protective facet, i.e. σ = 0. In this
case, the equilibrium level of social capital is
SC = n(e− ( α
γT
)
1
1−α ),
which is increasing in the intensity of the threat T as shown in Proposition 4.
A simple comparison shows that SC > SA for T > 1. Equilibrium payoffs are
u∗c =
{
u∗A if T ≤ 1
neγ + (1− nα)(αγ )
α
1−α ( 1T )
1
1−α otherwise
.
This payoff is increasing in T if and only if n > 1α . In that case, the non-
separable returns of social capital can compensate the reduction in private cap-
ital and the insecurity that the threat brings. The returns of social capital
increase with the size of the group. If the group is big enough then the diver-
sion of investments from private to social capital generates substantial enough
returns. When n < 1α , the returns of social capital are relatively small so the
diversion of investments cannot compensate the loss in private returns and the
emergence of the threat is harmful for the group. This case is probably the most
realistic since bonding social capital is more viable in relatively small communi-
ties. Hence, we should expect the threat to have a negative welfare effect when
social capital has important non-expropriable, i.e. bonding, returns.
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5.3 Endogenous threat
So far we have taken the threat as exogenous. But if one were to analyse the case
of two strategic agents engaged in a situation of mutual rivalry, the intensity of
the threat should be endogenous. This is what we explore next. We show that
the main results presented above still go through.
Let us assume that the threat is a unitary agent whose objective is to ap-
propriate the output produced by the community by making costly offensive
efforts. That is, the threat chooses a level of intensity T in order to maximize
uT = (1− p(T, S))
n∑
i=1
f(ki, S)− T.
Assuming that p(T, S) takes the form in (6) and denoting F (k, S) =
∑n
i=1 f(ki, S),
the best response of the threat to the choices of private and social capital of the
community is
T ∗ =
{
0 if σF (k, S) ≤ S
[σSσF (k, S)]
1
1+σ otherwise
,
The intensity of the threat depends critically on the level of social capital
in the community. On the one hand, social capital makes the community more
attractive to attack since the output that the threat can expropriate is larger.
At the same time, a large stock of social capital implies that the community can
protect itself better and is less attractive to the threat. It is immediate to see
that there can be no equilibrium in which the threat is of positive intensity and
the community attains full security; the threat would be better off by making
no offensive investments in that case. So two equilibria in pure strategies can
arise: In the first one, the autarkic level of social capital is high enough to fully
deter the threat. In the second equilibrium, the threat is of positive intensity
and the community only attains partial security. The level of social capital can
be above or below the autarkic level depending on the parameter constellations.
Proposition 5 Assume that the community and the threat choose their invest-
ments simultaneously. Then,
i) When β ≥ nσ, the community chooses the autarkic level of social capital SA
and fully deters the threat in equilibrium.
ii) When β ≤ (n − 1)σ, the threat is of positive intensity in equilibrium. In
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addition, there exists a threshold β˜ such that the level of social capital is
above SA if and only if β > β˜.
Proof. For the first profile to constitute an equilibrium we need σF (kA, SA) ≤
SA, which boils down to
σn
[
ααββ
] 1
1−α−β ≤ [ααβ1−α] 11−α−β ⇒ β ≥ nσ.
For the second profile, let us write down the best response of the threat to
the level of social capital SC , that is, the intensity T solving
T =
[
σ(SC)σF (kC , SC)
] 1
1+σ ,
which after some tedious algebra yields
T ∗ =
[
(nσ)1−α−β−σαα(β + σ)β+σ
] 1
1−α−β .
It remains to check that the level of social capital which emerges as the sum
of individual best responses to T ∗ indeed satisfies σF (kC , SC) > SC . Additional
calculations show that this is the case when
β ≤ σ(n− 1).
Finally, the level of social capital in the second equilibrium is
SC∗ =
(
αα(β + σ)1−α+σ
(nσ)σ
) 1
1−α−β
,
which is above the level under autarky SA if and only if
(nσ)σ ≤ (β + σ)σ
(
β + σ
β
)1−α
.
The right hand of the expression is increasing in β. It is easy to check that
the inequality holds strictly for β = (n−1)σ. Hence, there must exist a threshold
β˜ < (n−1)σ for which the expression holds with equality. Below that threshold,
the equilibrium level of social capital is below SA.
When social capital augments private capital considerably, i.e. β > nσ, the
community invests enough in social capital to fully deter the threat. This is
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despite the high output that the community generates being potentially very
attractive for the threat. This equilibrium is therefore identical to the autarkic
scenario. When social capital is moderately productive, i.e. β ∈ (β˜, (n − 1)σ),
the community does not invest enough to deter the threat, but it is still spurred
to invest in social capital above the autarky level. In this parameter region, the
threat can still have a positive effect on welfare. Finally, when social capital
augments private capital only weakly, i.e. β < β˜, the community makes low
investments in social capital, the intensity of the threat is relatively high and
property rights are insecure; welfare is hence lower than under autarky.11
5.4 Protective investments
In the analysis so far we have excluded investments with protective effects other
than social capital. But communities can also respond to an external threat by
investing in arms, militias, mercenaries or by building professional armies. This
matters for two reasons. First, because these investments, unlike social capital,
are not productive. Second, because when social capital is the only tool of a
community to face a threat, this necessarily leads to larger investments in it
as a response. We hence study whether our results are robust to a straightfor-
ward generalization of our baseline model incorporating the presence of arms
investments.
Assume that members of the community can now use their endowment to
invest in arms. Denote the individual investment in arms by gi. The new in-
dividual budget constraint is ki + si + gi + ci ≤ e. The protection function is
now
p(T, S,G) =
{
GρSσ
Tσ if T > G
ρ
σ S
1 otherwise
where G =
∑
i∈N gi and ρ ≥ 0 is the return of guns investments. Social capital
now augments the marginal productivity of arms investments. Note that the
case ρ = 0 corresponds to our baseline model.
The payoff function of an individual member now is
uCi = e− ki − si − gi + p(T, S,G)f(ki, S).
Members choose investments in arms and in private and social capital taking
11Note that when β ∈ ((n− 1)σ, nσ) an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist and the
equilibrium must be in mixed strategies. This is because the threat has an incentive to make
positive offensive efforts and the community to attain full security.
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as given the investments in social capital and arms made by the rest of members.
We assume that α+β+σ+ρ < 1 in order to ensure the existence of an interior
solution to this problem.
Under autarky, nothing changes with respect to the baseline model. There
is no need to invest in arms so the level of social capital remains SA. Things
change when the threat is of positive intensity. Because protection requires
arms investments. SA cannot be an equilibrium level of social capital any more.
It is easy to show that there exists a threshold threat intensity T ′o such that if
T ≤ T ′o, there is full security but the level of social capital under conflict is lower
than under autarky.12 This is because the community needs to invest in arms
in order to protect itself and diverts its investments away from social capital.
More importantly, the presence of arms investments can cancel the welfare-
enhancing effect of the external threat, as the following Proposition states.
Proposition 6 When the community can invest in arms and individual en-
dowments e are sufficiently large, there exists a threshold ρ˜ > 0 such that
welfare under the threat is below welfare under autarky if ρ > ρ˜.
Unlike social capital, arms investments are not productive. They are costly
in terms of foregone production and consumption possibilities. When invest-
ments in arms are sufficiently high, the welfare enhancing effect of the external
threat disappears because the community diverts too many resources away from
productive uses in order to protect itself. Such a result would be more likely
to hold in conflict scenarios where group solidarity is relatively less important
than the stock of arms in the protection of the community.
6 Concluding Comments
This paper has contributed to the literature which suggests that the relationship
between conflict and social capital is complex. Hostile inter-group interactions
can help to resolve intra-group social dilemmas and increase welfare. In the
present paper, we have weighed these internal welfare gains against the welfare
losses of hostile relations with an out-group. We found that conflict can induce
higher levels of social capital investment either because the protective aspect
of social capital comes into play and/or due to the reallocation of investments
from private to social capital. Given that social capital is potentially subject
12The proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
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to free-riding, the threat, by promoting a greater level of social capital, can be
welfare improving. As the threat becomes severe, social capital is more likely
to fall. Social capital may keep increasing as the threat becomes more intense
if its returns are not fully expropriable. But if social capital is not productive
enough, the threat may in this case induce lower welfare. Finally, we have also
shown that the enhancing effect of external conflict on social capital is weaker in
constrained economies. These poorer societies may end up being social capital
intensive but insecure as a result of the presence of an external threat.
These results can shed light on the sometimes contradicting evidence on
the relationship between conflict and social capital. Kickstarted by Bellows
and Miguel (2009), a strand of the literature has found a positive relationship
between violence and pro-social behavior in a number of developing countries.
More recently, a number of papers have contradicted or qualified these results,
suggesting that conflict decreases interethnic cooperation (Rohner et al., 2013)
and social capital, at least in the short run (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015).
While prolonged war generally strengthens self-consciousness and the self-image
of a community, ”it may often weaken the cohesion of multinational or sharply
stratified societies” (Smith, 1981, p. 390). A crucial distinction in this regard
is between internal and external conflict. Deng (2010) finds that social capital
increased in areas of South Sudan where violence was externally inflicted but
decreased where violence was endogenous. When counter-insurgency warfare
took place within villages, social tensions emerged, household composition be-
came more nuclear and members resorted more often to courts rather than to
private negotiation in order to solve disputes.
Our paper draws attention to the role of conflict in inducing social cohesion
and higher social welfare. Of course, the first best outcome would be that the
underprovision of social capital could be resolved without the stimulus of poten-
tial conflict. But in the absence of a peaceful mechanism to solve the collective
action problem, the potential for conflict acts as an alternative mechanism. Be-
cause of this, we think that our paper is also relevant to the portrayal of threats
in real-world politics. In recent times, in debates surrounding the ‘War on Ter-
ror’ and the Iraq war, there was much discussion about the role of war and the
sense of threat in promoting civic values in the US and other Western countries.
This was a position associated with neoconservatism. There was a suggestion
that even if the threat was not serious, it was a Platonic ‘noble lie’ to present it
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as such, if this could indeed promote civic values and national moral purpose.13
For instance, Hauk and Mueller (2015) show that cultural leaders may have an
incentive to supply cultural differences in a ’clash of civilizations’ scenario.
It is important to highlight one important modelling choice we made in our
analysis: We opted for parsimony and chose to model both bonding and bridging
social capital as just one type of investment. As a result, we cannot properly
investigate the effect of the threat on the substitution between bridging and
bonding social capital. This is an important question for two reasons. First,
because bonding social capital is likely to be less productive than bridging social
capital; the former can promote distrust, patronage, intolerance, and hate. Sec-
ond, because a society may deliberately adopt inferior ‘bonding’ technologies in
order to become unattractive to hostile out-groups and consequently stagnate
(Gonzalez, 2005). Had we modelled these two types of social capital separately,
bonding and bridging, the welfare implications of the threat would be less am-
biguous. Future research could study when external threats induce societies to
adopt exclusion and discrimination and the welfare effects of such a decision.
Our model suggests that the effect of conflict on social capital depends,
among other factors, on the intensity of the threat, the wealth of the community,
and the degree by which social capital augments the productivity of private
capital. It would be very interesting to see future empirical studies incorporating
all these considerations in their analyses.
References
[1] Alesina, A., and LaFerrara, E. (2000). Participation in Heterogeneous Com-
munities. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65(3), 847-904.
[2] Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilova´, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., and Mitts,
T. (2016). Can War Foster Cooperation? NBER Working Paper No. 22312.
[3] Becchetti, L., Conzo, P., and Romeo, A. (2014). Violence, Trust, and Trust-
worthiness: Evidence from a Nairobi Slum. Oxford Economic Papers, 66,
283–305.
13It is, of course, highly questionable whether the Iraq War actually did promote moral
purpose in Western countries. Skocpol (2002) argues that for conflict to bolster American
civic democracy, there needs to be a greater level of involvement in civic organisation than is
present in the modern U.S. In this sense, conflict can only trigger an increase in social capital
if there is a sufficient base of existing social capital.
31
[4] Bellows, J., and Miguel, E. (2009). War and Local Collective Action in
Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1144–1157.
[5] Bennett, T., Holloway, K., and Farrington, D. P. (2006). Does Neighbor-
hood Watch Reduce Crime? A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. Jour-
nal of Experimental Criminology, 2, 437-458.
[6] Besley, T., and Reynal-Querol, M. (2014). The Legacy of Historical Con-
flict: Evidence from Africa. American Political Science Review, 108(02),
319-336.
[7] Beugelsdijk, S., and Smulders. S. (2009). Social Capital and Economic
Growth. Tilburg University, Department of Economics, Mimeo.
[8] Bisin B., and Guaitoli, D. (2002). Social Capital, Modernization and
Growth. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Department of Economics,
Mimeo.
[9] Bornstein, G. (2003). Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collec-
tive Interests. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(2), 129-145.
[10] Bornstein, G., Gneezy, U., and Nagel, R. (2002). The Effect of Intergroup
Competition on Group: An Experimental Study. Games and Economic
Behavior, 41, 1-25.
[11] Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of
Taste. Harvard University Press.
[12] Bowles, S. (2009). Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect
the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors. Science, 324, 1293-1298.
[13] Cassar, A., Grosjean, P., and Whitt, S. (2013). Legacies of Violence: Trust
and Market development. Journal of Economic Growth, 18(3), 285-318.
[14] Choi, J.K., and Bowles, S. (2007). The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism
and War. Science, 318, 636-640.
[15] Chou, Y.K. (2006). Three Simple Models of Social Capital and Economic
Growth. The Journal of Socio–Economics, 35, 889–912.
[16] Coleman, J. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.
American Journal of Sociology, 94, S95–S120.
32
[17] Collier, P. (1999). On the Economic Consequences of Civil War. Oxford
Economic Papers, 51(1), 168-183.
[18] De Luca, G., and Verpoorten, M. (2015). Civil War, Social Capital and
Resilience in Uganda. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(3), 661–686.
[19] Deng, L.B. (2010). Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities
in Sudan’s Civil War. African Affairs, 109(435), 231-250.
[20] Di Pasquale, D., and Glaesar, E. (1999). Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens? Journal of Urban Economics, 45(2), 354-384.
[21] Durlauf, S., and Fafchamps, M. (2006). Social Capital. In P. Aghion and
S. Durlauf, Handbook of Economic Growth, Amsterdam: North Holland.
[22] Estrella-Lopez, O. (2003). Social Capital and Government in the Produc-
tion of Public Goods. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Department of
Economics, Mimeo.
[23] Erev, I., Bornstein, G., and Galili, R. (1993). Constructive Intergroup Com-
petition as a Solution to the Free Rider Problem: A Field Experiment.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 463-478.
[24] Francois, P., and Zabojnik, J. (2005). Trust, Social Capital and Economic
Development. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(1), 51-94.
[25] Garfinkel, M. R., and Skaperdas, S. (2007). Economics of Conflict: An
Overview. In T. Sandler, and K. Hartley, Handbook of Defense Economics
(Volume 2). New York: North-Holland.
[26] Gilligan, M.J., Pasquale, B.J., and Samii, C. (2014). Civil War and So-
cial Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal. American Journal of
Political Science, 58(3), 604-619.
[27] Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D., and Sacerdote, B. (2002). An Economic Ap-
proach to Social Capital. Economic Journal, 112, F437–F458
[28] Gneezy, A., and Fessler, D.M.T. (2012). Conflict, Sticks and Carrots: War
Increases Prosocial Punishments and Rewards. Proceedings of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, 279, 219-223.
[29] Gonzalez, F. M. (2005). Insecure Property and Technological Backward-
ness. Economic Journal, 115, 703-721.
33
[30] Grossman, H. I., and Kim, M. (1995). Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of
the Security of Claims to Property. Journal of Political Economy, 103(6),
1275-1288.
[31] Grossman, H. I., and Kim, M. (1996). Predation and Accumulation. Jour-
nal of Economic Growth, 1, 333-350.
[32] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2004). The Role of Social Capital
in Financial Development. American Economic Review, 94(3), 526-556.
[33] Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., and Sagiv, L. (2008). “In-Group Love” and
“Out-Group Hate” as Motives for Individual Participation in Intergroup
Conflict. Psychological Science, 19(4), 405-411.
[34] Hauk, E., and Mueller, H. (2015). Cultural Leaders and the Clash of Civi-
lizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(3), 367-400.
[35] Hedges, C. (2002). War is a Force that Gives us Meaning. New York: Public
Affairs.
[36] Hugh-Jones, D., and Zultan, R. (2012). Reputation and Cooperation in
Defense. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(2), 327-355.
[37] Jones, S.G. and Mun˜oz, A. (2010). Afghanistan’s Local War: Building
Local Defense Forces. RAND Corporation.
[38] Kang, J.H. (2015). Participation in the Community Social Control, the
Neighborhood Watch Groups: Individual- and Neighborhood-Related Fac-
tors. Crime and Delinquency, 61(2), 188-212.
[39] Kalyvas, S.N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[40] Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic
Payoff? a Cross-Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(4), 1251-88.
[41] Lyons, R.F., Mickelson, K.D., Sullivan, M., and Coyne, J.C. (1998). Cop-
ing as a Communal Process. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships,
15(5), 579-605.
[42] Mu¨nster, J., and Staal, K. (2011). War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside.
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28(2), 91-110.
34
[43] Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 123(1), 139-176.
[44] Nunn, N., and Wantchekon, L. (2011). The Slave Trade and the Origins of
Mistrust in Africa. American Economic Review, 101(7), 3221-3252.
[45] Pettigrew, J. (2004). Living Between the Maoists and Army in Rural Nepal.
In M. Hutt, Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press.
[46] Posner, B.R. (1993). Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.
International Security, 18(2), 80-124.
[47] Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling Alone. New York: Touchstone Books.
[48] Richards, P., Bah, K., and Vincent, J. (2004). Social Capital and Sur-
vival : Prospects for Community-driven Development in Post-conflict Sierra
Leone. World Bank Social Development Papers no. CPR 12.
[49] Robinson, J. (2001). Social identity, Inequality and Conflict. Economics of
Governance, 2, 85-99.
[50] Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., and Zilibotti, F. (2013). Seeds of Distrust: Con-
flict in Uganda. Journal of Economic Growth, 18, 217-252.
[51] Routledge, B., and von Amsberg, J. (2003). Social Capital and Growth.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 167–193.
[52] Sambanis, N., Skaperdas, S., and Wohlforth, W.C. (2015). Nation-Building
through War. American Political Science Review, 109(2), 279-296.
[53] Sanchez-Pages, S. (2006). On the Social Efficiency of Conflict. Economics
Letters, 90: 96-101.
[54] Sawyer, A. (2005). Social Capital, Survival Strategies, and their Potential
for Post-Conflict Governance in Liberia. WIDER Research Paper 2005/15.
[55] Sequeira, T.N., and Ferreira-Lopes, A. (2011). An Endogenous Growth
Model with Human and Social Capital interactions. Review of Social Econ-
omy, 69(4), 465-493.
[56] Skocpol, T. (2002). Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American
Civic Democracy? PS: Political Science and Politics, 35(3), 537-540.
35
[57] Snyder, J. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nation-
alist Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton.
[58] Smith, A. (1981). War and Ethnicity: The Role of Warfare in the Forma-
tion, Self-image and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 4(4), 375-397.
[59] Sobel, J. (2002). Can we Trust Social Capital? Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 60, 139–154.
[60] Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft.
Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
[61] Voors, M.J., Nillesen, E.E.M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E.H., Lensink, R., and
Van Soest, D.P. (2012). Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment
in Burundi. American Economic Review, 102(2), 941–964.
[62] Wintrobe, R. (1995). Some Economics of Ethnic Capital Formation and
Conflict. In A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R.E. Wintrobe, Na-
tionalism and Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[63] Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. (2001). Trust and Growth. Economic Journal, 111,
295–321.
36
